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Classifying the types of networks has been a focus of analysis in the
recent, small-world research. A unifying theory has been introduced to
provide an integrative perspective on the statistical properties of a
variety of real-world networks. This theory postulates that the existence
of constraints deters the emergence of a scale-free network. For
example, the theory argues that the constraints of airport capacity limit
the growth of air traffic, blocking the emergence of a scale-free network.
We challenge this argument by reexamining the context of the airline
industry. We empirically show that the U. S. airline route network is a
scale-free network despite the presence of capacity constraints. We
propose a new avenue for future research.
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INTRODUCTION
In 1938, passengers who flied with Delta Airlines from Fort
Worth, Texas to Atlanta, Georgia had to stop at six intermediate
points along the route (Lewis and Newton 1979). If any airline
company maintains this type of route structure today, perhaps it
will not stay in business. Passengers prefer to choose a carrier
that minimizes possible stopovers between origins and
destinations if other things are held constant. Due to this
preference, carriers wish to design the route networks that
connect origins and destinations with a minimum number of
stopovers. This number is often called “degrees of separation,”
which is one of the defining properties of the small-world
phenomenon (Strogatz 2001).
Understanding the mechanisms that reduce the degrees of
separation in a network has been a key issue in the burgeoning
literature on the small-world phenomenon (e.g., Barabasi and
Albert 1999; Barabasi, Albert and Jeong 1999; Milgram 1967;
Watts and Strogatz 1998). Prior research has identified hubs as a
mechanism to reduce the degrees of separation (Barabasi and
Albert, 1999; Barabasi et al. 1999). A hub is a node linked to
many other nodes — e.g., a hub airport is highly connected to
other airports, playing a role of minimizing the number of
stopovers. Empirical research has shown that many real-world
networks with hubs are characterized by scale-free distributions,
a kind of distribution that decays with a fat tail (see figure 1 for
the shape of the curve; e.g., Albert, Jeong and Barabasi 1999;
Faloutsos, Faloutsos and Faloutsos 1999; Liljeros et al. 2001).
Identifying the conditions under which this sort of distribution
emerges became of paramount importance in small-world
studies. Prior research recognized three mechanisms for the
emergence of scale-free networks: (1) networks continuously
expand by adding new nodes; (2) new nodes preferentially attach
to sites that are highly connected (Barabasi and Albert 1999;
Barabasi et al. 1999); and (3) capacity constraints limit the
growth of nodes (Amaral et al. 2000). In particular, Amaral et al.
(2000) argued that the existence of constraints on node capacity
restrains the emergence of scale-free networks. By analyzing the
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number of visitors at each airport, they found that its
distribution is not scale-free but with a fast-decaying tail (see
figure 1 for the shapes of the different curves).
It has been commonly understood that airports cannot
accommodate increasing traffic without limits. The additions of
both destinations and connecting flights to an airport are
bounded by capacity constraints such as runways, landing slots,
and/or terminal size (e.g., Bailey, Graham and Kaplan 1985;
Holloway 1997; Levine 1987). Therefore, the capacity constraints
in popular airports are roadblocks to building airline route
networks. In this paper, however, we challenge Amaral et al.’s
(2000) argument by reexamining the context of the airline
industry. We show that the U. S. airline route network is a scale-
free network.
We also show that the structure of this network is very stable
over time after the enactment of the Airline Deregulation Act in
1978. It has been claimed that the airline deregulation changed
the nature of competition significantly. Indeed, carriers
subsequently competed on the basis of building more efficient
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Figure 1. Truncation of Scale-Free Connectivity with Constraints*
* Source: Amaral, L.A.N., Scala, A., Barthelemy, M., & Stanley, H.E. 2000.
Classes of small world networks. Proceedings of the National Academy of Science
of America, 97(21): 11151
* The cumulative distribution curve with no cost is a scale-free network, the
cumulative distribution curve with low cost is a broad-scale network, and the
cumulative distribution curve with high cost is a single-scale network.
route networks such as hub-and-spoke systems (Levine 1987;
Poole and Butler 1999). Intensified competition cornered airlines
with less efficient route networks, resulting in a series of mergers
and bankruptcies (Donohue and Ghemawat 1995). Therefore, it
is rather natural to believe that such a sea change in the
competitive landscape might have changed the properties of the
scale-free network after 10 or 20 years. Yet, our analysis shows
that the structure of the scale-free network has been surprisingly
stable for about twenty years since the deregulation. The stability
of the scale-free distribution indicates that the hubs of some
carriers are connected with the unusually large numbers of
destinations. Our research further shows that these carriers
increased their market shares at the top twenty hub airports
over time whereas weaker carriers were driven out of
competition. This finding suggests that building highly connected
hubs, which reduce the degrees of separation for air travelers,
has been a source of competitive advantages. This is a functional
implication of being a small-world.
LITERATURE REVIEW
A small-world phenomenon has attracted attention from
various disciplines. The essence of this phenomenon is captured
by the small-world hypothesis: Although there are so many
people in the world, two randomly chosen individuals are
separated by six degrees at most. Milgram (1967) provided the
first systematic evidence for this hypothesis. Conducting an
experiment to trace a chain of acquaintances in the U. S., he
found that people are, indeed, separated by six degrees at most.
Recent studies have investigated how this phenomenon is
possible, providing two explanations. The first explanation is
related to the concept of shortcuts (Watts and Strogatz 1998), or
what Granovetter (1973) called social bridges. The role of
shortcuts could be illustrated by the study of homosexual
networks in the early spread of AIDS (Klovdahl 1985).
Homosexuals tend to interact with other homosexuals who live
within geographically close areas. That is, geographical distance
should limit the spread of the disease. But it quickly spread
through homosexuals across the entire North America. The
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Centers for Disease Control and Prevention found that one
patient, who was a flight attendant for Air Canada, played a key
role in the spread of the disease. He traveled worldwide and
frequented bathhouses in San Francisco, Los Angeles,
Vancouver, Toronto, and New York. Strogatz (2003, p. 252)
noted: “At least 40 of the first 248 men diagnosed with AIDS had
sex either with him or with one of his previous partners.” The
flight attendant is an exemplary case of shortcuts, whose
function is to reduce the degrees of separation between two
randomly chosen individuals.
The second explanation for the small-world phenomenon
(Barabasi and Albert 1999; Barabasi et al. 1999) is associated
with the concept of hub. Its role was illustrated in Albert et al.’s
(1999) research on the Word-Wide Web (WWW). Although there
are a vast number of documents in WWW, two randomly chosen
documents on the Web are on average only 19 clicks away from
each other. They found the presence of hubs — for example,
some websites such as CNN and Yahoo are connected with
thousands of newly created Web pages while the hundreds of
billions of documents with no link at all. Like shortcuts, the
presence of hubs dramatically reduces the degrees of separation
in a large network.
Such a small-world phenomenon led many researchers to
examine various large networks that consist of a vast number of
nodes, such as WWW, cellular networks, metabolic networks,
and neural networks (e.g., Bhalla and Iyengar 1999; Jeong et al.
2000; Kohn 1999; Achacoso and Yamamoto 1992). When a
network has more than a couple of hundred nodes, it becomes
difficult to visualize its patterns. A typical way to study such a
large network has been to look into a connectivity distribution (a
number of links for each node and its frequency). In particular,
patterns of a tail in a distribution became the focus of analysis
for large networks. Based on the tail patterns, networks are
classified into three classes: (1) single-scale, (2) scale-free, and
(3) broad-scale networks (Amaral et al., 2000; see figure 1 for the
shapes of the distribution curves for the three networks). First,
single-scale networks are characterized by a connectivity
distribution with a fast decaying tail — such distribution has a
characteristic scale like mean. For example, the power grid of the
western U.S. and a social network of Mormons in Utah are
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single-scale networks. Second, scale-free networks are
characterized by a fat tail, or a connectivity distribution curve
that tails off toward zero much more slowly than that of a single
scale network. More precisely, the tail behavior is characterized
by a power-law curve — when one draws the power-law curve in
a log-log plot, it will show a straight line. For example, the
network of WWW is characterized by a scale-free (power-law)
distribution. Albert et al. (1999, p. 130) noted: “The power-law
tail indicates that the probability of finding documents with a
large number of links is significant, as the network connectivity
is dominated by highly connected web pages (hubs).” Third,
broad-scale networks are characterized by a connectivity
distribution that has a power-law regime followed by a sharp cut-
off as shown in figure 1. They are sometimes called “truncated”
scale-free networks. For example, the co-authorship network of
scientists is shown as a broad-scale network (Newman 2001).
Prior research has examined how different classes of networks
could emerge. Barabasi and Albert (1999) identified two
mechanisms that generate scale-free networks: (1) networks
continuously expand by adding new nodes; (2) new nodes
preferentially attach to sites that are highly connected. Consider,
for example, WWW. It grows over time by adding new Web pages.
A newly created Web page will be more likely to include links to
well-known popular documents with already-high connectivity.
As the network evolves over time, popular documents (i.e., hubs)
will attract more and more newly created Web pages. In a
nutshell, the preferential attachment rule implies that the rich
will get richer over time. 
However, Amaral et al. (2000) argued that preferential
attachment can be hindered by constraints. That is, when the
cost of adding new links to an existing node increases over time
or when a node has a capacity limit for adding links, “the rich-
get-richer principle” will not generate a scale-free network.
Through computer simulations, they found that constraints to
preferential attachment lead to cut-offs on power-law curves.
Whether a network grows into a single-scale network or a broad-
scale network depends on the magnitude of constraints. When
constraints are modest, a power-law region is possible but
followed by a sharp cut-off (broad-scale network). For example,
consider the co-authorship network of scientists. Once a
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researcher becomes famous in a certain area, many researchers
may want to collaborate with her. Through this rich-get-richer
principle, she will publish more papers by working with many
collaborators. However, the limited life span does not allow her to
publish forever through collaboration. This implies that the
connectivity distribution of co-authorship networks will have a
power-law regime followed by a modest cut-off. When constraints
are strong enough, no power-law region is visible (single-scale
network). For example, consider the acquaintance network of
Mormons in Utah. Because of time constraints, each individual
cannot make hundreds of or thousands of close friends. Such
strong constraints put brake on the rich-get-richer principle,
resulting in a single-scale network. 
In short, Amaral et al. (2000) provided a unifying framework
that generates three classes of networks by controlling the
magnitude of constraints. Do these constraints always matter?
Do they always put brake on the emergence of scale-free
networks? In this paper, we offer an anomaly to the unifying
framework by reexamining the context of the airline industry.
Amaral et al. (2000, p. 11151) noted that the existence of
capacity constraints in the airline industry limits the generation
of scale-free networks as follows: 
This effect [cost of adding links to the nodes and the limited
capacity of a node] is exemplified by the network of world
airports: for reasons of efficiency, commercial airlines prefer to
have a small number of hubs where all routes connect. In fact,
this situation is, to a first approximation, indeed what
happens for individual airlines; however, when we consider all
airlines together, it becomes physically impossible for an
airport to become a hub to all airlines. Because of space and
time constraints, each airport will limit the number of
landings/departures per hour and the number of passengers
in transit. Hence, physical costs of adding links and limited
capacity of a vertex [node] will limit the number of possible
links attaching to a given vertex.
We agree that the capacity constraints in popular hubs do
restrain the rich-get-richer principle. However, we empirically
show that the route network in the U.S. airline industry follows a
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scale-free distribution.
EMPIRICAL CONTEXT AND DATA
This study examines the evolution of the route network of all
the airline companies in the U. S. after the enactment of the
Airline Deregulation Act in 1978. Prior to the deregulation, the
industry competition including price, entry, and exit was pretty
much controlled by the Civil Aeronautics Board. After 1978,
airline companies were allowed to compete on all the three
dimensions. Poole and Butler (1999: 44) noted: “American cities
have been offered much greater air travel access, thanks to an
aviation marketplace in which airlines are free to provide service
when and where demand exists, without having to seek
permission from central planners.” Deregulation led to a
significant increase in air traffic, triggering the process of making
air service a commodity.
In the era of the regulatory protection, airlines mostly ran a
route network of often fragmented and semi-exclusive point-to-
point segments that link major cities directly. During the first ten
years of deregulation, the major airlines changed their route
structures from point-to-point to hub-and-spoke route systems
(Poole and Butler 1999). Prior to the 1978 deregulation, Delta
pioneered the concept of hub-and-spoke route systems at
Atlanta, Georgia. Intense competition after the 1978 deregulation
encouraged airlines to consider the new type of network
architecture for their routes. Emulating the Delta model, major
trunk airlines began to establish hubs at what had been initially
origin-and-destination airports (point-to-point route networks).
Some of these airports include Charlotte, Dallas, Detroit,
Minneapolis, Pittsburgh, and St. Louis. The hub-and-spoke route
systems increased the number of route connections for air
travelers. For example, Poole and Butler (1999, p. 45) noted:
First, those living in the hub-airport city gained access to a
many-fold increase in the number of destinations and the
number of flights. Second, residents of small cities on the
spokes of the hub, who may have lost some point-to-point
service, gained access to potentially hundreds of destinations
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via the hub. 
By scheduling many feeder flights — the spokes of the network
— into the hub airport, airlines were able to achieve substantial
cost advantages. Well-designed hub and spoke architectures can
improve operating efficiencies with fewer aircrafts, fewer crew
members, and higher frequencies. Furthermore, the market
power of an airline company at an airport is positively associated
with the number of destinations from that airport. For example,
Donohue and Ghemawat (1995, p. 8) noted: “Well-developed hub
systems let incumbents underprice entrant point-to-point
competition and still maintain satisfactory systemwide yield
levels.” As obtaining hubs with better locations became critical in
competitive warfare during the mid-1980s, major carriers
acquired many second-tier carriers to secure valuable hubs. For
example, by acquiring Ozark, TWA was able to dominate the St.
Louis hub.
In order to examine the evolution of the route network for all
U.S. airlines, we collected data for all the U.S. domestic airline
routes, annual operation capacity at route level, and annual
frequency of flights at each route in 1979, 1981, 1986, 1991,
1996, 2000, and 2002. The data are obtained from a commercial
database firm in the airline industry, the BACK Association. The
number of destinations for an airline at an airport is the unit of
analysis. This is more relevant and important for studying the
strategic behavior of airline companies than the number of
visitors at an airport, which was the focus of analysis in Amaral
et al. (2000). We analyzed the connectivity distribution of all
airline routes in the U. S. for the seven years. We also
investigated changes in the market share of a dominant carrier
at the top twenty airports between 1979 and 2000.
FINDINGS
Figure 2 presents the connectivity distribution of the U.S.
airline route network in 1981, 1991, and 2001. It shows that the
connectivity distribution decays with a power-law tail. More
specifically, the probability that an airline has k destinations at
an airport has a power-law tail for large k, following P(k) ~ kγ,
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where γ = 2.6±2 (see table 1 for details). In contrast to the study
of Amaral et al. (2000), our study shows that the fat-tail pattern
is stable over the last two decades. In addition, figure 3 shows
that the U.S. airline route network is resilient against the
terrorist attack on September 11, 2001. This external shock
decreased domestic airline passengers by 18% in the fourth
quarter of 2001 compared to the same quarter of the previous
year (Department of Transportation 2003). However, the fat-tail
pattern remains unchanged although there are minor changes in
the detail. Our finding is consistent with Albert et al. (2000), who
numerically showed that scale-free networks are robust against a
random shock.
It is well-known that airports cannot accommodate increasing
traffic without a limit. Expanding both passenger capacity and
connecting flights at an airport is bounded by constraints such
as runways, landing slots, and/or terminal size. Why, then, does
the connectivity distribution remain stable? To address this
question, we investigated changes in major characteristics of the
top twenty airports (by the rank of passenger traffic in 2001)
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Figure 2. Connectivity Distribution of U.S. Airline Route Network
Table 1. Power-law Exponents Over Time
Year 1979 1981 1986 1991 1996 2000 2002
Power law exponent 2.5 2.4 2.7 2.7 2.8 2.7 2.7
Number of Observations 2982 2620 2815 2650 2980 2879 2608
between 1979 and 2000 (see table 2). Those characteristics
include dominant carrier’s market share (by the number of
passenger per airlines), total number of departing passengers,
and the number of destinations for a dominant carrier. The table
shows that while there is a marginal increase in the total number
of departing passengers over the last two decades, market shares
and the number of destinations for a dominant carrier increased
significantly. The evolution of the route networks shows a
dramatic increase in concentration level by single dominant
carriers. Windle and Dresner (1993) defined hub monopoly
airports as those airports where one carrier had at least 60
percent market share of the departures. In 1979, there was only
one monopoly hub out of the top twenty airports. In 2000, the
number of monopoly hubs increases to nine. Furthermore, all of
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Table 2. Dominant Carriers at the Top Twenty Airports
1979 2000
Top 20 No of No of
Airports








Atlanta DL 48.4 62 37,217,876 DL 76.9 135 53,852,805
Chicago UA 35.4 63 44,354,517 UA 50.9 126 45,627,912
Dallas AA 24.1 41 23,601,674 AA 66.9 120 39,532,727
Los Angeles UA 25.2 37 30,726,366 UA 31.0 54 38,188,431
Phoenix AA 21.3 18 7,966,658 HP 43.6 76 28,350,746
Denver UA 29.6 45 21,618,374 UA 70.4 106 25,650,865
Las Vegas WA 19.7 10 8,828,665 WN 31.4 41 23,102,793
Minneapolis NW 42.3 26 10,716,235 NW 77.7 119 24,014,137
Houston WN 15.7 7 14,663,678 CO 79.8 110 20,419,880
Detroit NW 19.5 10 12,253,587 NW 77.0 110 23,786,631
San Fran. UA 37.0 39 21,246,755 UA 52.6 50 23,142,816
NY (Newark) EA 26.5 22 9,560,220 CO 51.8 60 20,339,402
St Louis TW 38.4 41 12,402,787 TW 72.8 102 24,635,690
Seattle UA 30.1 19 11,263,796 AS 43.7 46 19,081,922
Orlando DL 38.2 12 7,749,707 DL 31.2 36 17,930,414
Miami EA 34.7 35 14,863,798 AA 55.8 38 12,502,852
Philadelphia US 25.4 31 10,640,650 US 66.2 85 19,058,658
NY (LG) EA 24.0 20 14,532,516 US 31.9 51 19,747,322
Charlotte EA 60.4 23 3,987,040 US 90.2 98 18,263,461
Boston DL 23.9 17 12,258,732 US 26.5 36 20,169,666
the top twenty hubs except the Orlando International Airport
show increases in market share by their dominant carriers. Table
2 also shows that the number of destinations for dominant
































Figure 4. Distribution of Yearly Number of Operations for U.S.
Airlines
carriers increased substantially. For example, the number of
destinations for the dominant carrier at the George Bush
Intercontinental Airport in Houston was only seven in 1979 but
increased to 110 in 2000. Delta had 62 destinations from the
Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport in 1979 but 135
in 2000. These facts suggest that the “rich-get-richer” principle
may be in operation, letting the connectivity distribution remain
stable.
On the other hand, some of our empirical findings support the
theoretical prediction of Amaral et al. (2000). That is, capacity
constraints do sometimes hinder the rich-get-richer principle in
generating scale-free networks. Figures 4 and 5 show the
distributions for the numbers of flights and annual scheduled
seats respectively. Unlike the distributions curves in figures 2
and 3, those in figures 4 and 5 are characterized by power-law
regions followed by cut-offs. This indicates that the distributions
for the numbers of flights and scheduled seats are broad-scale
networks or truncated scale-free networks. These results suggest
that capacity constraints at airports do matter for flight
frequency and scheduled seats. In addition, the distribution
curve in figure 4 is more sharply curtailed at the right than that
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Figure 5 . Distribution of Yearly Scheduled Seats for U.S. Airlines
in figure 5. One possible explanation is that the number of yearly
scheduled seats can be flexibly controlled by changing the size of
fleets. That is, airline companies do have some strategic
capabilities to cope with the capacity constraints. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
We reexamined the main argument of the unifying framework
in the context of the U. S. airline route network. The unifying
framework posits that the existence of constraints restrains the
emergence of scale-free networks (Amaral et al. 2000). However,
we found that the connectivity distributions of the U. S. airline
route network decay with power-law tails (scale-free network).
Surprisingly, the fat-tail pattern is stable over time despite the
contention that the growth of airline companies has been
bounded by capacity constraints at hub airports. This finding is
in direct contrast to that of Amaral et al. (2000).
We do believe that capacity constraints exist at popular
airports. Then, why could the unifying framework not explain the
empirical regularity in the airline industry? The evolution of the
U.S. airline industry shows that after the 1978 deregulation,
weak carriers were driven out of competition and left rooms for
surviving airlines. If there is intense competition in the industry,
then who will be more likely to take over the space of exiting
players? The rich-get-richer principle predicts that carriers with
higher connectivity are more likely to overtake the space
(Barabasi and Albert 1999). Indeed, our data demonstrate that
carriers who built up highly connected networks with hubs
enhanced their dominant status at the top twenty hub airports
over the last two decades. This suggests that carriers with better
route networks tended to grow at the expense of weak carriers.
For example, after 1978, Braniff, Eastern, Frontier, Western,
Republic, National, Ozark, and Piedmont were either liquidated
or acquired by dominant carriers. An explanation for the rich-
get-richer principle in this industry is that some airlines that
bring more feeder traffic at hub airports generally perform better.
For example, Delta initially built its hub at the Atlanta airport by
connecting flights to several destinations even before the 1978
deregulation. The initial advantage with high connectivity
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appeared to allow Delta to add more destinations over time,
leading its Atlanta hub to become the largest hub connecting 135
destinations. In short, the growth of “the rich” at the expense of
“the poor” may have lifted the constraining bar on the emergence
of scale-free networks.
A plethora of real-world networks are found to be small-world
networks, which are characterized by small degrees of
separation. Now, researchers begin to explore the question of
whether small-world networks, such as scale-free networks,
provide any functional advantages. The empirical context
analyzed in this study offers insight into this question. One
reason why airlines with hubs and high connectivity can do
better over time is associated with customer preference.
Customers prefer to choose an airline that provides service with
the fewer stopovers when other things are held constant. An
airline with higher connectivity will be more flexible in providing
air service with fewer stopovers between an origin and a
destination. Indeed, building an efficient hub and spoke system,
which is designed to reduce the number of stopovers (or degrees
of separation in a general term), became a source of competitive
advantage in the industry. This is one functional implication of
being a small-world in the airline industry.
Our study provides a new avenue for future theoretical
research. The unifying framework thus far provided an
integrative perspective on the role of network growth, preferential
attachment, and constraints. What is missing in this framework
is an explicit selection process — the rich gets richer, driving out
the poor simultaneously. The context of the airline industry
suggests a clue for the existence of natural selection pressures
that weed out less fit airlines, leaving their space at the hub
airports for the growth of dominant carriers. Future research can
model this context by incorporating competition among agents,
who grow by building networks and drive out others. More
broadly, future studies can investigate mechanisms that allow
the emergence of scale-free networks in the presence of
constraints. 
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